Introduction
In Crypt1997, Zheng [1] proposed a new cryptographic primitive: signcryption, which can perform digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously at lower computational costs and communication overheads than signature-then-encryption approach, it can provide both confidentiality and authentication. Recently, lattice has emerged as a possible alternative to number theory. Ajtai [2] first gave the idea of trapdoor function for lattice and showed that the average-case hardness of some lattice problem is equivalent to its worst-case hardness. Additionally, lattice-based cryptography is believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. Li et al., [3] first proposed a lattice-based signcryption scheme, and proved that the proposed scheme secure under lattice problems.
Motivation The concept of identity-based cryptosystem was firstly proposed by Shamir [4] in 1984. In Crypto 2001, Boneh et al., [5] proposed identity-based encryption from Weil pairing. Later, identity-based signcryption has been increasingly researched because of the simplicity of a public key management [6, 7, 8] . Our goal is to design an identity-based signcryption scheme from lattice hard problems.
Contribution We present the first identity-based signcryption scheme from lattice, and proved that the proposed scheme has the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption and unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks under the small integer solution (SIS) assumption in the random oracle model. Comparison with sign-then-encrypt approach shows that our scheme is efficient.
Outline of the Paper We introduce the preliminary work about lattice in Section 2. In Section 3, we review the formal model of identity-based signcryption. In Section 4 we describe our new identity-based signcryption scheme from lattice. We compare our protocol with other approaches in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6. s  , and n-dimensional lattice  , the discrete Gaussian distribution over  is defined as Regev [9] and Peikert [10] respectively showed that, for certain moduli q and Gaussian error distributions  , the Using Gaussian techniques, Micciancio and Regev [11] showed that the SIS problem is as hard (on the average) as approximating certain worst-case problems on lattices to within small factors.
Trapdoors for Lattice
Eurocrypt 2012, Micciancio and Peikert [12] gave a new notion of trapdoor for hard random lattice, which is simultaneously simple, efficient, tighter, faster, and small. They also gave algorithms for inverting LWE, randomly sampling SIS preimages, and securely delegating trapdoors, the following theorem summarizes the main results. 
Definition 3 Let

Security Notions
In this section, we will recall Malone-Lee's [13] security models for id-based signcryption scheme.
Definition 4 An id-based signcryption scheme is said to have the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks property (IND-IDSC-CCA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Setup The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and obtains common parameters params and a master key s. He sends params to the adversary A and keeps s secret.
Phase 1
The adversary A performs a polynomial bounded number of queries. These queries may be made adaptively, i.e., each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.  Key extraction queries: A produces an identity id and receives the extracted private key id s =Extract(id 
Definition 5 An id-based signcryption scheme is said to be secure against an existential forgery for adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-IDSC-CMA) if no polynomial bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
(1) The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and obtains common parameters params and a master key s. He sends params to the adversary A and keeps s secret.
(2) The adversary A performs a polynomial bounded number of queries adaptively just like in the previous definition. 
The Signcryption Scheme
In this section, we present an efficient identity-base signcryption scheme from lattice.
Parameters set as If no tuple of this kind satisfies the equation, C stops and outputs "failure". Probability of success. Now, we assess C 's probability of success. For the simulation is perfect without aborting, we require the following conditions fulfilled:
(1) Extract queries: Then the probability of C not aborting is .
If the simulation does not abort, the adversary will win the game in definition 5 with probability at least  . Then C can solve for the LWE problem instance with probability       C first sets the public parameters using the setup algorithm described in the previous proof. Then the forger can perform a polynomial bounded number queries including random oracle queries, private key extraction queries, signcryption queries, and unsigncryption queries. The challenger C answers the forger in the same way as that of Theorem 2 except 2 H query. (1)
